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Register a new userA Hybrid Artificial-Noise and Secret-Key Scheme for Securing OFDM Transmissions in V2G Networks
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Added by
Ahmed El Shafie
Publication date
2018
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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We propose a new scheme to enhance the physical-layer security of wireless single-input single-output orthogonal-frequency division-multiplexing (OFDM) transmissions from an electric vehicle, Alice, to the aggregator, Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. To prevent information leakage to Eve, Alice exploits the wireless channel randomness to extract secret key symbols that are used to encrypt some data symbols which are then multiplexed in the frequency domain with the remaining unencrypted data symbols. To secure the unencrypted data symbols, Alice transmits an artificial-noise (AN) signal superimposed over her data signal. We propose a three-level optimization procedure to increase the average secrecy rate of this wiretap channel by optimizing the transmit power allocation between the encrypted data symbols, unencrypted data symbols and the AN symbols. Our numerical results show that the proposed scheme achieves considerable secrecy rate gains compared to the benchmark cases
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We investigate the physical-layer security of indoor hybrid parallel power-line/wireless orthogonal-frequency division-multiplexing (OFDM) communication systems. We propose an artificial-noise (AN) aided scheme to enhance the systems security in the presence of an eavesdropper by exploiting the decoupled nature of the power-line and wireless communication media. The proposed scheme does not require the instantaneous channel state information of the eavesdroppers links to be known at the legitimate nodes. In our proposed scheme, the legitimate transmitter (Alice) and the legitimate receiver (Bob) cooperate to secure the hybrid system where an AN signal is shared from Bob to Alice on the link with the lower channel-to-noise ratio (CNR) while the information stream in addition to a noisy-amplified version of the received AN signal is transmitted from Alice to Bob on the link with higher CNR at each OFDM sub-channel. In addition, we investigate the effect of the transmit power levels at both Alice and Bob and the power allocation ratio between the data and AN signals at Alice on the secure throughput. We investigate both single-link eavesdropping attacks, where only one link is exposed to eavesdropping attacks, and two-link eavesdropping attacks, where the two links are exposed to eavesdropping attacks.
This paper investigates artificial noise injection into the temporal and spatial dimensions of a legitimate wireless communication system to secure its transmissions from potential eavesdropping. We consider a multiple-input single-output (MISO) orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) system in the presence of a single-antenna passive eavesdropper and derive both the secrecy rate and average secrecy rate of the legitimate system. It is assumed that the legitimate transmitter knows the full channel information of the legitimate transceivers but does not know the instantaneous channel state information of the passive eavesdropper. Closed-form expressions for the secrecy rate and average secrecy rate are derived for the asymptotic case with a large number of transmit antennas. We also investigate 1) the power allocation between the data and the AN; 2) the power allocation between the spatial and the temporal AN. Computer simulations are carried out to evaluate the performance of our proposed artificial noise scheme.
We investigate the physical layer security of uplink single-carrier frequency-division multiple-access (SC-FDMA) systems. Multiple users, Alices, send confidential messages to a common legitimate base-station, Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. To secure the legitimate transmissions, each user superimposes an artificial noise (AN) signal on the time-domain SC-FDMA data block. We reduce the computational and storage requirements at Bobs receiver by assuming simple per-subchannel detectors. We assume that Eve has global channel knowledge of all links in addition to high computational capabilities, where she adopts high-complexity detectors such as single-user maximum likelihood (ML), multiuser minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE), and multiuser ML. We analyze the correlation properties of the time-domain AN signal and illustrate how Eve can exploit them to reduce the AN effects. We prove that the number of useful AN streams that can degrade Eves signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is dependent on the channel memories of Alices-Bob and Alices-Eve links. Furthermore, we enhance the system security for the case of partial Alices-Bob channel knowledge at Eve, where Eve only knows the precoding matrices of the data and AN signals instead of knowing the entire Alices-Bob channel matrices, and propose a hybrid scheme that integrates temporal AN with channel-based secret-key extraction.
The unique information ($UI$) is an information measure that quantifies a deviation from the Blackwell order. We have recently shown that this quantity is an upper bound on the one-way secret key rate. In this paper, we prove a triangle inequality for the $UI$, which implies that the $UI$ is never greater than one of the best known upper bounds on the two-way secret key rate. We conjecture that the $UI$ lower bounds the two-way rate and discuss implications of the conjecture.
The partial information decomposition (PID) is a promising framework for decomposing a joint random variable into the amount of influence each source variable Xi has on a target variable Y, relative to the other sources. For two sources, influence breaks down into the information that both X0 and X1 redundantly share with Y, what X0 uniquely shares with Y, what X1 uniquely shares with Y, and finally what X0 and X1 synergistically share with Y. Unfortunately, considerable disagreement has arisen as to how these four components should be quantified. Drawing from cryptography, we consider the secret key agreement rate as an operational method of quantifying unique informations. Secret key agreement rate comes in several forms, depending upon which parties are permitted to communicate. We demonstrate that three of these four forms are inconsistent with the PID. The remaining form implies certain interpretations as to the PIDs meaning---interpretations not present in PIDs definition but that, we argue, need to be explicit. These reveal an inconsistency between third-order connected information, two-way secret key agreement rate, and synergy. Similar difficulties arise with a popular PID measure in light the results here as well as from a maximum entropy viewpoint. We close by reviewing the challenges facing the PID.
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