ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
We propose a computationally feasible way of deriving the identified features of models with multiple equilibria in pure or mixed strategies. It is shown that in the case of Shapley regular normal form games, the identified set is characterized by the inclusion of the true data distribution within the core of a Choquet capacity, which is interpreted as the generalized likelihood of the model. In turn, this inclusion is characterized by a finite set of inequalities and efficient and easily implementable combinatorial methods are described to check them. In all normal form games, the identified set is characterized in terms of the value of a submodular or convex optimization program. Efficient algorithms are then given and compared to check inclusion of a parameter in this identified set. The latter are illustrated with family bargaining games and oligopoly entry games.
We study testable implications of multiple equilibria in discrete games with incomplete information. Unlike de Paula and Tang (2012), we allow the players private signals to be correlated. In static games, we leverage independence of private types ac
We study the rise in the acceptability fiat money in a Kiyotaki-Wright economy by developing a method that can determine dynamic Nash equilibria for a class of search models with genuine heterogenous agents. We also address open issues regarding the
We study the impact of weak identification in discrete choice models, and provide insights into the determinants of identification strength in these models. Using these insights, we propose a novel test that can consistently detect weak identificatio
This paper studies identification and estimation of a class of dynamic models in which the decision maker (DM) is uncertain about the data-generating process. The DM surrounds a benchmark model that he or she fears is misspecified by a set of models.
This paper studies the econometric aspects of the generalized local IV framework defined using the unordered monotonicity condition, which accommodates multiple levels of treatment and instrument in program evaluations. The framework is explicitly de