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Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study convexity, core and the Shapley value of games with interval uncertainty. Our motivation to do so is twofold. First, we want to capture which properties are preserved when we generalize concepts from classical cooperative game theory to interval games. Second, since these generalizations can be done in different ways, mainly with regard to the resulting level of uncertainty, we try to compare them and show their relation to each other.
Partially defined cooperative games are a generalisation of classical cooperative games in which payoffs for some of the coalitions are not known. In this paper we perform a systematic study of partially defined games, focusing on two important class
In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the potential, h
Stochastic games, introduced by Shapley, model adversarial interactions in stochastic environments where two players choose their moves to optimize a discounted-sum of rewards. In the traditional discounted reward semantics, long-term weights are geo
We analyze in this paper finite horizon hierarchical signaling games between (information provider) senders and (decision maker) receivers in a dynamic environment. The underlying information evolves in time while sender and receiver interact repeate
We consider the question of whether, and in what sense, Wardrop equilibria provide a good approximation for Nash equilibria in atomic unsplittable congestion games with a large number of small players. We examine two different definitions of small pl