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Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a contract between a public entity and a consortium, in which the public outsources the construction and the maintenance of an equipment (hospital, university, prison...). One drawback of this contract is that the public may not be able to observe the effort of the consortium but only its impact on the social welfare of the project. We aim to characterize the optimal contract for a PPP in this setting of asymmetric information between the two parties. This leads to a stochastic control under partial information and it is also related to principal-agent problems with moral hazard. Considering a wider set of information for the public and using martingale arguments in the spirit of Sannikov, the optimization problem can be reduced to a standard stochastic control problem, that is solved numerically. We then prove that for the optimal contract, the effort of the consortium is explicitly characterized. In particular, it is shown that the optimal rent is not a linear function of the effort, contrary to some models of the economic literature on PPP contracts.
This paper studies optimal Public Private Partnerships contract between a public entity and a consortium, in continuous-time and with a continuous payment, with the possibility for the public to stop the contract. The public (she) pays a continuous r
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In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), spectrum trading is an efficient way for secondary users (SUs) to achieve dynamic spectrum access and to bring economic benefits for the primary users (PUs). Existing methods requires full payment from SU, which bl
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We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many circumstances, these co