اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدProtecting others vs. protecting yourself against ballistic droplets: Quantification by stain patterns
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It is often accepted a priori that a face mask worn by an infected subject is effective to avoid the spreading of a respiratory disease, while a healthy person is not necessarily well protected when wearing the mask. Using a frugal stain technique, we quantify the ballistic droplets reaching a receptor from a jet-emitting source which mimics a coughing, sneezing or talking human: in real life, such droplets may host active SARS-CoV-2 virus able to replicate in the nasopharynx. We demonstrate that materials often used in home-made face masks block most of the droplets. We also show quantitatively that less liquid carried by ballistic droplets reaches a receptor when a blocking material is deployed near the source than when located near the receptor, which supports the paradigm that your face mask does protect you, but protects others even better than you.
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