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تسجيل مستخدم جديدTowards Strengthening Deep Learning-based Side Channel Attacks with Mixup
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In recent years, various deep learning techniques have been exploited in side channel attacks, with the anticipation of obtaining more appreciable attack results. Most of them concentrate on improving network architectures or putting forward novel algorithms, assuming that there are adequate profiling traces available to train an appropriate neural network. However, in practical scenarios, profiling traces are probably insufficient, which makes the network learn deficiently and compromises attack performance. In this paper, we investigate a kind of data augmentation technique, called mixup, and first propose to exploit it in deep-learning based side channel attacks, for the purpose of expanding the profiling set and facilitating the chances of mounting a successful attack. We perform Correlation Power Analysis for generated traces and original traces, and discover that there exists consistency between them regarding leakage information. Our experiments show that mixup is truly capable of enhancing attack performance especially for insufficient profiling traces. Specifically, when the size of the training set is decreased to 30% of the original set, mixup can significantly reduce acquired attacking traces. We test three mixup parameter values and conclude that generally all of them can bring about improvements. Besides, we compare three leakage models and unexpectedly find that least significant bit model, which is less frequently used in previous works, actually surpasses prevalent identity model and hamming weight model in terms of attack results.
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