اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدThe Effect of Behavioral Probability Weighting in a Simultaneous Multi-Target Attacker-Defender Game
44
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
We consider a security game in a setting consisting of two players (an attacker and a defender), each with a given budget to allocate towards attack and defense, respectively, of a set of nodes. Each node has a certain value to the attacker and the defender, along with a probability of being successfully compromised, which is a function of the investments in that node by both players. For such games, we characterize the optimal investment strategies by the players at the (unique) Nash Equilibrium. We then investigate the impacts of behavioral probability weighting on the investment strategies; such probability weighting, where humans overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities, has been identified by behavioral economists to be a common feature of human decision-making. We show via numerical experiments that behavioral decision-making by the defender causes the Nash Equilibrium investments in each node to change (where the defender overinvests in the high-value nodes and underinvests in the low-value nodes).
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Ramp merging is considered as one of the major causes of traffic congestion and accidents because of its chaotic nature. With the development of connected and automated vehicle (CAV) technology, cooperative ramp merging has become one of the popular
solutions to this problem. In a mixed traffic situation, CAVs will not only interact with each other, but also handle complicated situations with human-driven vehicles involved. In this paper, a game theory-based ramp merging strategy has been developed for the optimal merging coordination of CAVs in the mixed traffic, which determines dynamic merging sequence and corresponding longitudinal/lateral control. This strategy improves the safety and efficiency of the merging process by ensuring a safe inter-vehicle distance among the involved vehicles and harmonizing the speed of CAVs in the traffic stream. To verify the proposed strategy, mixed traffic simulations under different penetration rates and different congestion levels have been carried out on an innovative Unity-SUMO integrated platform, which connects a game engine-based driving simulator with a traffic simulator. This platform allows the human driver to participate in the simulation, and also equip CAVs with more realistic sensing systems. In the traffic flow level simulation test, Unity takes over the sensing and control of all CAVs in the simulation, while SUMO handles the behavior of all legacy vehicles. The results show that the average speed of traffic flow can be increased up to 110%, and the fuel consumption can be reduced up to 77%, respectively.
Microgrids (MG) are anticipated to be important players in the future smart grid. For proper operation of MGs an Energy Management System (EMS) is essential. The EMS of an MG could be rather complicated when renewable energy resources (RER), energy s
torage system (ESS) and demand side management (DSM) need to be orchestrated. Furthermore, these systems may belong to different entities and competition may exist between them. Nash equilibrium is most commonly used for coordination of such entities however the convergence and existence of Nash equilibrium can not always be guaranteed. To this end, we use the correlated equilibrium to coordinate agents, whose convergence can be guaranteed. In this paper, we build an energy trading model based on mid-market rate, and propose a correlated Q-learning (CEQ) algorithm to maximize the revenue of each agent. Our results show that CEQ is able to balance the revenue of agents without harming total benefit. In addition, compared with Q-learning without correlation, CEQ could save 19.3% cost for the DSM agent and 44.2% more benefits for the ESS agent.
In this paper, we show how a dynamic population game can model the strategic interaction and migration decisions made by a large population of agents in response to epidemic prevalence. Specifically, we consider a modified susceptible-asymptomatic-in
fected-recovered (SAIR) epidemic model over multiple zones. Agents choose whether to activate (i.e., interact with others), how many other agents to interact with, and which zone to move to in a time-scale which is comparable with the epidemic evolution. We define and analyze the notion of equilibrium in this game, and investigate the transient behavior of the epidemic spread in a range of numerical case studies, providing insights on the effects of the agents degree of future awareness, strategic migration decisions, as well as different levels of lockdown and other interventions. One of our key findings is that the strategic behavior of agents plays an important role in the progression of the epidemic and can be exploited in order to design suitable epidemic control measures.
This paper studies social cooperation backed peer-to-peer energy trading technique by which prosumers can decide how they can use their batteries opportunistically for participating in the peer-to-peer trading. The objective is to achieve a solution
in which the ultimate beneficiaries are the prosumers, i.e., a prosumer-centric solution. To do so, a coalition formation game is designed, which enables a prosumer to compare its benefit of participating in the peer-to-peer trading with and without using its battery and thus, allows the prosumer to form suitable social coalition groups with other similar prosumers in the network for conducting peer-to-peer trading. The properties of the formed coalitions are studied, and it is shown that 1) the coalition structure that stems from the social cooperation between participating prosumers at each time slot is both stable and optimal, and 2) the outcomes of the proposed peer- to-peer trading scheme is prosumer-centric. Case studies are conducted based on real household energy usage and solar generation data to highlight how the proposed scheme can benefit prosumers through exhibiting prosumer-centric properties.
The spreading dynamics of an epidemic and the collective behavioral pattern of the population over which it spreads are deeply intertwined and the latter can critically shape the outcome of the former. Motivated by this, we design a parsimonious game
-theoretic behavioral--epidemic model, in which an interplay of realistic factors shapes the co-evolution of individual decision-making and epidemics on a network. Although such a co-evolution is deeply intertwined in the real-world, existing models schematize population behavior as instantaneously reactive, thus being unable to capture human behavior in the long term. Our model offers a unified framework to model and predict complex emergent phenomena, including successful collective responses, periodic oscillations, and resurgent epidemic outbreaks. The framework also allows to assess the effectiveness of different policy interventions on ensuring a collective response that successfully eradicates the outbreak. Two case studies, inspired by real-world diseases, are presented to illustrate the potentialities of the proposed model.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
