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Targeted False Data Injection Attack against DC State Estimation without Line Parameters

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 نشر من قبل Mingqiu Du
 تاريخ النشر 2021
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A novel false data injection attack (FDIA) model against DC state estimation is proposed, which requires no network parameters and exploits only limited phasor measurement unit (PMU) data. The proposed FDIA model can target specific states and launch large deviation attacks using estimated line parameters. Sufficient conditions for the proposed method are also presented. Different attack vectors are studied in the IEEE 39-bus system, showing that the proposed FDIA method can successfully bypass the bad data detection (BDD) with high success rates of up to 95.3%.



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