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In this chapter we review some of the basic attack constructions that exploit a stochastic description of the state variables. We pose the state estimation problem in a Bayesian setting and cast the bad data detection procedure as a Bayesian hypothesis testing problem. This revised detection framework provides the benchmark for the attack detection problem that limits the achievable attack disruption. Indeed, the trade-off between the impact of the attack, in terms of disruption to the state estimator, and the probability of attack detection is analytically characterized within this Bayesian attack setting. We then generalize the attack construction by considering information-theoretic measures that place fundamental limits to a broad class of detection, estimation, and learning techniques. Because the attack constructions proposed in this chapter rely on the attacker having access to the statistical structure of the random process describing the state variables, we conclude by studying the impact of imperfect statistics on the attack performance. Specifically, we study the attack performance as a function of the size of the training data set that is available to the attacker to estimate the second-order statistics of the state variables.
The security of energy supply in a power grid critically depends on the ability to accurately estimate the state of the system. However, manipulated power flow measurements can potentially hide overloads and bypass the bad data detection scheme to in
State estimation is a data processing algorithm for converting redundant meter measurements and other information into an estimate of the state of a power system. Relying heavily on meter measurements, state estimation has proven to be vulnerable to
We address the problem of robust state reconstruction for discrete-time nonlinear systems when the actuators and sensors are injected with (potentially unbounded) attack signals. Exploiting redundancy in sensors and actuators and using a bank of unkn
State estimation is of considerable significance for the power system operation and control. However, well-designed false data injection attacks can utilize blind spots in conventional residual-based bad data detection methods to manipulate measureme
A novel false data injection attack (FDIA) model against DC state estimation is proposed, which requires no network parameters and exploits only limited phasor measurement unit (PMU) data. The proposed FDIA model can target specific states and launch