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Design companies often outsource their integrated circuit (IC) fabrication to third parties where ICs are susceptible to malicious acts such as the insertion of a side-channel hardware trojan horse (SCT). In this paper, we present a framework for designing and inserting an SCT based on an engineering change order (ECO) flow, which makes it the first to disclose how effortlessly a trojan can be inserted into an IC. The trojan is designed with the goal of leaking multiple bits per power signature reading. Our findings and results show that a rogue element within a foundry has, today, all means necessary for performing a foundry-side attack via ECO.
Intel has introduced a trusted computing technology, Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), which provides an isolated and secure execution environment called enclave for a user program without trusting any privilege software (e.g., an operating syste
Data deduplication is able to effectively identify and eliminate redundant data and only maintain a single copy of files and chunks. Hence, it is widely used in cloud storage systems to save storage space and network bandwidth. However, the occurrenc
GPUs are increasingly being used in security applications, especially for accelerating encryption/decryption. While GPUs are an attractive platform in terms of performance, the security of these devices raises a number of concerns. One vulnerability
This paper proposes an upgraded electro-magnetic side-channel attack that automatically reconstructs the intercepted data. A novel system is introduced, running in parallel with leakage signal interception and catching compromising data in real-time.
Numerous previous works have studied deep learning algorithms applied in the context of side-channel attacks, which demonstrated the ability to perform successful key recoveries. These studies show that modern cryptographic devices are increasingly t