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تسجيل مستخدم جديدBitcoin Trading is Irrational! An Analysis of the Disposition Effect in Bitcoin
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Investors tend to sell their winning investments and hold onto their losers. This phenomenon, known as the emph{disposition effect} in the field of behavioural finance, is well-known and its prevalence has been shown in a number of existing markets. But what about new atypical markets like cryptocurrencies? Do investors act as irrationally as in traditional markets? One might suspect this and hypothesise that cryptocurrency sells occur more frequently in positive market conditions and less frequently in negative market conditions. However, there is still no empirical evidence to support this. In this paper, we expand on existing research and empirically investigate the prevalence of the disposition effect in Bitcoin by testing this hypothesis. Our results show that investors are indeed subject to the disposition effect, tending to sell their winning positions too soon and holding on to their losing position for too long. This effect is very prominently evident from the boom and bust year 2017 onwards, confirmed via most of the applied technical indicators. In this study, we show that Bitcoin traders act just as irrationally as traders in other, more established markets.
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