ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Online learning in a two-sided matching market, with demand side agents continuously competing to be matched with supply side (arms), abstracts the complex interactions under partial information on matching platforms (e.g. UpWork, TaskRabbit). We study the decentralized serial dictatorship setting, a two-sided matching market where the demand side agents have unknown and heterogeneous valuation over the supply side (arms), while the arms have known uniform preference over the demand side (agents). We design the first decentralized algorithm -- UCB with Decentralized Dominant-arm Deletion (UCB-D3), for the agents, that does not require any knowledge of reward gaps or time horizon. UCB-D3 works in phases, where in each phase, agents delete emph{dominated arms} -- the arms preferred by higher ranked agents, and play only from the non-dominated arms according to the UCB. At the end of the phase, agents broadcast in a decentralized fashion, their estimated preferred arms through {em pure exploitation}. We prove both, a new regret lower bound for the decentralized serial dictatorship model, and that UCB-D3 is order optimal.
We study contextual bandits with ancillary constraints on resources, which are common in real-world applications such as choosing ads or dynamic pricing of items. We design the first algorithm for solving these problems that handles constrained resou
We introduce a new model of stochastic bandits with adversarial corruptions which aims to capture settings where most of the input follows a stochastic pattern but some fraction of it can be adversarially changed to trick the algorithm, e.g., click f
Lipschitz bandits is a prominent version of multi-armed bandits that studies large, structured action spaces such as the [0,1] interval, where similar actions are guaranteed to have similar rewards. A central theme here is the adaptive discretization
In recent years, federated learning has been embraced as an approach for bringing about collaboration across large populations of learning agents. However, little is known about how collaboration protocols should take agents incentives into account w
We study a decentralized cooperative stochastic multi-armed bandit problem with $K$ arms on a network of $N$ agents. In our model, the reward distribution of each arm is the same for each agent and rewards are drawn independently across agents and ti