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تسجيل مستخدم جديدPing-pong quantum key distribution with trusted noise: non-Markovian advantage
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The ping-pong protocol adapted for quantum key distribution is studied in the trusted quantum noise scenario, wherein the legitimate parties can add noise locally. For a well-studied attack model, we show how non-unital quantum non-Markovianity of the added noise can improve the key rate. We also point out that this noise-induced advantage cannot be obtained by Alice and Bob by adding local classical noise to their post-measurement data.
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