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تسجيل مستخدم جديدNATTACK: Learning the Distributions of Adversarial Examples for an Improved Black-Box Attack on Deep Neural Networks
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Powerful adversarial attack methods are vital for understanding how to construct robust deep neural networks (DNNs) and for thoroughly testing defense techniques. In this paper, we propose a black-box adversarial attack algorithm that can defeat both vanilla DNNs and those generated by various defense techniques developed recently. Instead of searching for an optimal adversarial example for a benign input to a targeted DNN, our algorithm finds a probability density distribution over a small region centered around the input, such that a sample drawn from this distribution is likely an adversarial example, without the need of accessing the DNNs internal layers or weights. Our approach is universal as it can successfully attack different neural networks by a single algorithm. It is also strong; according to the testing against 2 vanilla DNNs and 13 defended ones, it outperforms state-of-the-art black-box or white-box attack methods for most test cases. Additionally, our results reveal that adversarial training remains one of the best defense techniques, and the adversarial examples are not as transferable across defended DNNs as them across vanilla DNNs.
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