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تسجيل مستخدم جديدPreferential attachment graphs with co-existing types of different fitnesses
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تأليف
Jonathan Jordan
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We extend the work of Antunovi{c}, Mossel and R{a}cz on competing types in preferential attachment models to include cases where the types have different fitnesses, which may be either multiplicative or additive. We will show that, depending on the values of the parameters of the models, there are different possible limiting behaviours depending on the zeros of a certain function. In particular we will show the existence of choices of the parameters where one type is favoured both by having higher fitness and by the type attachment mechanism, but the other type has a positive probability of dominating the network in the limit.
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