ترغب بنشر مسار تعليمي؟ اضغط هنا

Low-Cost Learning via Active Data Procurement

219   0   0.0 ( 0 )
 نشر من قبل Bo Waggoner
 تاريخ النشر 2015
  مجال البحث الهندسة المعلوماتية
والبحث باللغة English




اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث

We design mechanisms for online procurement of data held by strategic agents for machine learning tasks. The challenge is to use past data to actively price future data and give learning guarantees even when an agents cost for revealing her data may depend arbitrarily on the data itself. We achieve this goal by showing how to convert a large class of no-regret algorithms into online posted-price and learning mechanisms. Our results in a sense parallel classic sample complexity guarantees, but with the key resource being money rather than quantity of data: With a budget constraint $B$, we give robust risk (predictive error) bounds on the order of $1/sqrt{B}$. Because we use an active approach, we can often guarantee to do significantly better by leveraging correlations between costs and data. Our algorithms and analysis go through a model of no-regret learning with $T$ arriving pairs (cost, data) and a budget constraint of $B$. Our regret bounds for this model are on the order of $T/sqrt{B}$ and we give lower bounds on the same order.



قيم البحث

اقرأ أيضاً

Active reinforcement learning (ARL) is a variant on reinforcement learning where the agent does not observe the reward unless it chooses to pay a query cost c > 0. The central question of ARL is how to quantify the long-term value of reward informati on. Even in multi-armed bandits, computing the value of this information is intractable and we have to rely on heuristics. We propose and evaluate several heuristic approaches for ARL in multi-armed bandits and (tabular) Markov decision processes, and discuss and illustrate some challenging aspects of the ARL problem.
107 - Xi Alice Gao , Avi Pfeffer 2012
While game theory is widely used to model strategic interactions, a natural question is where do the game representations come from? One answer is to learn the representations from data. If one wants to learn both the payoffs and the players strategi es, a naive approach is to learn them both directly from the data. This approach ignores the fact the players might be playing reasonably good strategies, so there is a connection between the strategies and the data. The main contribution of this paper is to make this connection while learning. We formulate the learning problem as a weighted constraint satisfaction problem, including constraints both for the fit of the payoffs and strategies to the data and the fit of the strategies to the payoffs. We use quantal response equilibrium as our notion of rationality for quantifying the latter fit. Our results show that incorporating rationality constraints can improve learning when the amount of data is limited.
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using external payments. We consider a scenario where an external party, which is interested in having the players work together, offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition (or, more generally, a particular coalition structure). This payment is conditional on players not deviating from their coalition(s). The sum of this payment plus the actual gains of the coalition(s) may then be divided among the agents so as to promote stability. We define the emph{cost of stability (CoS)} as the minimal external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide general bounds on the cost of stability in several classes of games, and explore its algorithmic properties. To develop a better intuition for the concepts we introduce, we provide a detailed algorithmic study of the cost of stability in weighted voting games, a simple but expressive class of games which can model decision-making in political bodies, and cooperation in multiagent settings. Finally, we extend our model and results to games with coalition structures.
Making decisions in the presence of a strategic opponent requires one to take into account the opponents ability to actively mask its intended objective. To describe such strategic situations, we introduce the non-cooperative inverse reinforcement le arning (N-CIRL) formalism. The N-CIRL formalism consists of two agents with completely misaligned objectives, where only one of the agents knows the true objective function. Formally, we model the N-CIRL formalism as a zero-sum Markov game with one-sided incomplete information. Through interacting with the more informed player, the less informed player attempts to both infer, and act according to, the true objective function. As a result of the one-sided incomplete information, the multi-stage game can be decomposed into a sequence of single-stage games expressed by a recursive formula. Solving this recursive formula yields the value of the N-CIRL game and the more informed players equilibrium strategy. Another recursive formula, constructed by forming an auxiliary game, termed the dual game, yields the less informed players strategy. Building upon these two recursive formulas, we develop a computationally tractable algorithm to approximately solve for the equilibrium strategies. Finally, we demonstrate the benefits of our N-CIRL formalism over the existing multi-agent IRL formalism via extensive numerical simulation in a novel cyber security setting.
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be evolutionary stable or that could learn itself. Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order secure at least the Stackelberg leader payoff. The impossibility result remains intact when restricted to the classes of generic games, two-player games, potential games, games with strategic complements or 2x2 games, in which learning is known to be nice. More generally, it also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria, rationalizable outcomes, iterated admissible outcomes, or minimal curb sets. A possibility result restricted to strategically trivial games fails if some generic games outside this class are considered as well.

الأسئلة المقترحة

التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
mircosoft-partner

هل ترغب بارسال اشعارات عن اخر التحديثات في شمرا-اكاديميا