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In a two-stage repeated classical game of prisoners dilemma the knowledge that both players will defect in the second stage makes the players to defect in the first stage as well. We find a quantum version of this repeated game where the players decide to cooperate in the first stage while knowing that both will defect in the second.
The notion of emph{policy regret} in online learning is a well defined? performance measure for the common scenario of adaptive adversaries, which more traditional quantities such as external regret do not take into account. We revisit the notion of
We examine a patient players behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the p
We investigate the effect of conditional null measurements on a quantum system and find a rich variety of behaviors. Specifically, quantum dynamics with a time independent $H$ in a finite dimensional Hilbert space are considered with repeated strong
A framework for discussing relationships between different types of games is proposed. Within the framework, quantum simultaneous games, finite quantum simultaneous games, quantum sequential games, and finite quantum sequential games are defined. In
We study two forms of a symmetric cooperative game played by three players, one classical and other quantum. In its classical form making a coalition gives advantage to players and they are motivated to do so. However in its quantum form the advantag