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تسجيل مستخدم جديدMultiple Choice Minority Game
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Minority game is a model of heterogeneous players who think inductively. In this game, each player chooses one out of two alternatives every turn and those who end up in the minority side wins. It is instructive to extend the minority game by allowing players to choose one out of many alternatives. Nevertheless, such an extension is not straight-forward due to the difficulties in finding a set of reasonable, unbiased and computationally feasible strategies. Here, we propose a variation of the minority game where every player has more than two options. Results of numerical simulations agree with the expectation that our multiple choices minority game exhibits similar behavior as the original two-choice minority game.
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