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تسجيل مستخدم جديدOn the meaning of the Critical Cost Efficiency Index
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Federico Echenique
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This note provides a critical discussion of the textit{Critical Cost-Efficiency Index} (CCEI) as used to assess deviations from utility-maximizing behavior. I argue that the CCEI is hard to interpret, and that it can disagree with other plausible measures of irrational behavior. The common interpretation of CCEI as wasted income is questionable. Moreover, I show that one agent may have more unstable preferences than another, but seem more rational according to the CCEI. This calls into question the (now common) use of CCEI as an ordinal and cardinal measure of degrees of rationality.
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