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We study the implications of endogenous pricing for learning and welfare in the classic herding model . When prices are determined exogenously, it is known that learning occurs if and only if signals are unbounded. By contrast, we show that learning can occur when signals are bounded as long as non-conformism among consumers is scarce. More formally, learning happens if and only if signals exhibit the vanishing likelihood property introduced bellow. We discuss the implications of our results for potential market failure in the context of Schumpeterian growth with uncertainty over the value of innovations.
We analyze statistical discrimination in hiring markets using a multi-armed bandit model. Myopic firms face workers arriving with heterogeneous observable characteristics. The association between the workers skill and characteristics is unknown ex an
In this paper, we consider a network of consumers who are under the combined influence of their neighbors and external influencing entities (the marketers). The consumers opinion follows a hybrid dynamics whose opinion jumps are due to the marketing
A common assumption in auction theory is that the information available to the agents is given exogenously and that the auctioneer has full control over the market. In practice, agents might be able to acquire information about their competitors befo
We consider a discrete-time nonatomic routing game with variable demand and uncertain costs. Given a routing network with single origin and destination, the cost function of each edge depends on some uncertain persistent state parameter. At every per
The prevalence of e-commerce has made detailed customers personal information readily accessible to retailers, and this information has been widely used in pricing decisions. When involving personalized information, how to protect the privacy of such