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تسجيل مستخدم جديدSpatially Focused Attack against Spatiotemporal Graph Neural Networks
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Spatiotemporal forecasting plays an essential role in various applications in intelligent transportation systems (ITS), such as route planning, navigation, and traffic control and management. Deep Spatiotemporal graph neural networks (GNNs), which capture both spatial and temporal patterns, have achieved great success in traffic forecasting applications. Understanding how GNNs-based forecasting work and the vulnerability and robustness of these models becomes critical to real-world applications. For example, if spatiotemporal GNNs are vulnerable in real-world traffic prediction applications, a hacker can easily manipulate the results and cause serious traffic congestion and even a city-scale breakdown. However, despite that recent studies have demonstrated that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to carefully designed perturbations in multiple domains like objection classification and graph representation, current adversarial works cannot be directly applied to spatiotemporal forecasting due to the causal nature and spatiotemporal mechanisms in forecasting models. To fill this gap, in this paper we design Spatially Focused Attack (SFA) to break spatiotemporal GNNs by attacking a single vertex. To achieve this, we first propose the inverse estimation to address the causality issue; then, we apply genetic algorithms with a universal attack method as the evaluation function to locate the weakest vertex; finally, perturbations are generated by solving an inverse estimation-based optimization problem. We conduct experiments on real-world traffic data and our results show that perturbations in one vertex designed by SA can be diffused into a large part of the graph.
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