اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدDiscrete-variable quantum key distribution with homodyne detection
165
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Most quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols could be classified as either a discrete-variable (DV) protocol or continuous-variable (CV) protocol, based on how classical information is being encoded. We propose a protocol that combines the best of both worlds: the simplicity of quantum state preparation in DV protocols as well as the cost-effective and high bandwidth of homodyne detectors that are normally used in CV protocols. In addition, our protocol does not require the honest parties to share the same reference phase, in contrast to typical CV-QKD protocols. We then prove the security of the proposed protocol in the asymptotic limit under the assumption of collective attacks. Our simulation suggests that the protocol is suitable for secure and high-speed practical key distribution over short distances.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution with homodyne detection is widely known for the simplicity on implementation, the efficiency in error correction and the compatibility with modern optical communication devices. However,
recent work indicates that using homodyne detection will lead to poor tolerance of excess noise and insufficient transmission distance, hence seriously restricting the large-scale deployment of quantum secure communication networks. Here, we propose a homodyne detection protocol using the technique of quadrature phase shift keying. By limiting information leakage, our protocol enhances excess noise tolerance to a high level. Furthermore, we demonstrate that using homodyne detection performs better than heterodyne detection in quaternary-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution under the untrusted detector noise scenario. The security is analyzed by tight numerical method against collective attacks in the asymptotic regime. Results imply that our protocol possesses the ability to distribute keys in nearly intercity area. This progress will make our protocol the main force in constructing low-cost quantum secure communication networks.
In this paper we report a continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol using multimode coherent states generated on subcarrier frequencies of the optical spectrum. To detect the quadrature components of bosonic field we propose a coherent de
tection scheme where power from a carrier wave is used as a local oscillator. We compose a mathematical model of the proposed scheme and perform its security analysis in the finite-size regime using fully quantum asymptotic equipartition property technique. We calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate for the system under the assumption that the quantum channel noise is negligible compared to detector dark counts, and an eavesdropper is restricted to collective attacks. Our calculation shows that the current realistic system implementation would allow distributing secret keys over channels with losses up to 9 dB.
We consider discrete-modulation protocols for continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) that employ a modulation constellation consisting of a finite number of coherent states and that use a homodyne or a heterodyne-detection receiver. We
establish a security proof for collective attacks in the asymptotic regime, and we provide a formula for an achievable secret-key rate. Previous works established security proofs for discrete-modulation CV-QKD protocols that use two or three coherent states. The main constituents of our approach include approximating a complex, isotropic Gaussian probability distribution by a finite-size Gauss-Hermite constellation, applying entropic continuity bounds, and leveraging previous security proofs for Gaussian-modulation protocols. As an application of our method, we calculate secret-key rates achievable over a lossy thermal bosonic channel. We show that the rates for discrete-modulation protocols approach the rates achieved by a Gaussian-modulation protocol as the constellation size is increased. For pure-loss channels, our results indicate that in the high-loss regime and for sufficiently large constellation size, the achievable key rates scale optimally, i.e., proportional to the channels transmissivity.
Information reconciliation is crucial for continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) because its performance affects the secret key rate and maximal secure transmission distance. Fixed-rate error correction codes limit the potential applic
ations of the CV-QKD because of the difficulty of optimizing such codes for different low SNRs. In this paper, we propose a rateless reconciliation protocol combined multidimensional scheme with Raptor codes that not only maintains the rateless property but also achieves high efficiency in different SNRs using just one degree distribution. It significantly decreases the complexity of optimization and increases the robustness of the system. Using this protocol, the CV-QKD system can operate with the optimal modulation variance which maximizes the secret key rate. Simulation results show that the proposed protocol can achieve reconciliation efficiency of more than 95% within the range of SNR from -20 dB to 0 dB. It also shows that we can obtain a high secret key rate at arbitrary distances in a certain range and achieve a secret key rate of about 5*10^(-4) bits/pulse at a maximum distance of 132 km (corresponding SNR is -20dB) that is higher than previous works. The proposed protocol can maintain high efficient key extraction under the wide range of SNRs and paves the way toward the practical application of CV-QKD systems in flexible scenarios.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution exploits coherent measurements of the electromagnetic field, i.e., homodyne or heterodyne detection. The most advanced security analyses developed so far relied on idealised mathematical models for such me
asurements, which assume that the measurement outcomes are continuous and unbounded variables. As any physical measurement device has finite range and precision, these mathematical models only serve as an approximation. It is expected that, under suitable conditions, the predictions obtained using these simplified models are in good agreement with the actual experimental implementations. However, a quantitative analysis of the error introduced by this approximation, and of its impact on composable security, have been lacking so far. Here we present a theory to rigorously account for the experimental limitations of realistic heterodyne detection. We focus on asymptotic security against collective attacks, and indicate a route to include finite-size effects.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
