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تسجيل مستخدم جديدBeyond Model Extraction: Imitation Attack for Black-Box NLP APIs
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Machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) has attracted millions of users to their outperforming sophisticated models. Although published as black-box APIs, the valuable models behind these services are still vulnerable to imitation attacks. Recently, a series of works have demonstrated that attackers manage to steal or extract the victim models. Nonetheless, none of the previous stolen models can outperform the original black-box APIs. In this work, we take the first step of showing that attackers could potentially surpass victims via unsupervised domain adaptation and multi-victim ensemble. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets and real-world APIs validate that the imitators can succeed in outperforming the original black-box models. We consider this as a milestone in the research of imitation attack, especially on NLP APIs, as the superior performance could influence the defense or even publishing strategy of API providers.
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