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تسجيل مستخدم جديدChoice Functions
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This is a survey paper on rainbow sets (another name for ``choice functions). The main theme is the distinction between two types of choice functions: those having a large (in the sense of belonging to some specified filter, namely closed up set of sets) image, and those that have a large domain and small image, where ``smallness means belonging to some specified complex (a closed-down set). The paper contains some new results: (1) theorems on scrambl
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