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تسجيل مستخدم جديدA Concavification Approach to Ambiguous Persuasion
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Xiaoyu Cheng
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This note shows that the value of ambiguous persuasion characterized in Beauchene, Li and Li(2019) can be given by a concavification program as in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). More specifically, it implies that an ambiguous persuasion game can be equivalently formalized as a Bayesian persuasion game with distorted utility functions. This result is obtained under a novel construction of ambiguous persuasion.
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