اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدNonclassical Attack on a Quantum KeyDistribution System
53
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
The article is focused on research of an attack on the quantum key distribution system and proposes a countermeasure method. Particularly noteworthy is that this is not a classic attack on a quantum protocol. We describe an attack on the process of calibration. Results of the research show that quantum key distribution systems have vulnerabilities not only in the protocols, but also in other vital system components. The described type of attack does not affect the cryptographic strength of the received keys and does not point to the vulnerability of the quantum key distribution protocol. We also propose a method for autocompensating optical communication system development, which protects synchronization from unauthorized access. The proposed method is based on the use of sync pulses attenuated to a photon level in the process of detecting a time interval with a signal. The paper presents the results of experimental studies that show the discrepancies between the theoretical and real parameters of the system. The obtained data allow the length of the quantum channel to be calculated with high accuracy.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation time. The att
ack can remain unnoticed, since the faked states do not increase the error rate per se. This allows for an intercept-resend attack, where an eavesdropper transfers her detection events to the legitimate receiver without causing any errors. As a side effect, afterpulses, originating from accumulated charge carriers in the detectors, increase the error rate. We have experimentally tested detectors of the system id3110 (Clavis2) from ID Quantique. We identify the parameter regime in which the attack is feasible despite the side effect. Furthermore, we outline how simple modifications in the implementation can make the device immune to this attack.
In this paper we present the quantum control attack on quantum key distribution systems. The cornerstone of the attack is that Eve can use unitary (polar) decomposition of her positive-operator valued measure elements, which allows her to realize the
feed-forward operation (quantum control), change the states in the channel after her measurement and impose them to Bob. Below we consider the general eavesdropping strategy and the conditions those should be satisfied to provide the attack successfully. Moreover we consider several types of the attack, each of them is based on a different type of discrimination. We also provide the example on two non-orthogonal states and discuss different strategies in this case.
We discuss a simple search problem which can be pursued with different methods, either on a classical or on a quantum basis. The system is represented by a chain of trapped ions. The ion to be searched is a member of that chain, consists, however, of
an isotopic species different to the others. It is shown that the classical imaging may lead as fast to the final result as the quantum imaging. However, for the discussed case the quantum method gives more flexibility and higher precision when the number of ions considered in the chain is increasing. In addition, interferences are observable even when the distances between the ions is smaller than half a wavelength of the incident light.
While quantum mechanics exquisitely describes the behavior of microscopic systems, one ongoing challenge is to explore its applicability to systems of larger size and mass. Unfortunately, quantum states of increasingly macroscopic objects are more ea
sily corrupted by unintentional measurements from the classical environment. Additionally, even the intentional measurements from the observer can further perturb the system. In optomechanics, coherent light fields serve as the intermediary between the fragile mechanical states and our inherently classical world by exerting radiation pressure forces and extracting mechanical information. Here we engineer a microwave cavity optomechanical system to stabilize a nonclassical steady-state of motion while independently, continuously, and nondestructively monitoring it. By coupling the motion of an aluminum membrane to two microwave cavities, we separately prepare and measure a squeezed state of motion. We demonstrate a quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement of sub-vacuum mechanical quadrature fluctuations. The techniques developed here have direct applications in the areas of quantum-enhanced sensing and quantum information processing, and could be further extended to more complex quantum states.
In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector control attacks have been successfully launched
on several QKD systems, and attracted widespread concerns. Here, we propose a robust countermeasure against these attacks just by introducing a variable attenuator in front of the detector. This countermeasure is not only effective against the attacks with blinding light, but also robust against the attacks without blinding light which are more concealed and threatening. Different from previous technical improvements, the single photon detector in our countermeasure model is treated as a blackbox, and the eavesdropper can be detected by statistics of the detection and error rates of the QKD system. Besides theoretical proof, the countermeasure is also supported by an experimental demonstration. Our countermeasure is general in sense that it is independent of the technical details of the detector, and can be easily applied to the existing QKD systems.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
