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تسجيل مستخدم جديدDual Attention Suppression Attack: Generate Adversarial Camouflage in Physical World
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Deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples. As a more threatening type for practical deep learning systems, physical adversarial examples have received extensive research attention in recent years. However, without exploiting the intrinsic characteristics such as model-agnostic and human-specific patterns, existing works generate weak adversarial perturbations in the physical world, which fall short of attacking across different models and show visually suspicious appearance. Motivated by the viewpoint that attention reflects the intrinsic characteristics of the recognition process, this paper proposes the Dual Attention Suppression (DAS) attack to generate visually-natural physical adversarial camouflages with strong transferability by suppressing both model and human attention. As for attacking, we generate transferable adversarial camouflages by distracting the model-shared similar attention patterns from the target to non-target regions. Meanwhile, based on the fact that human visual attention always focuses on salient items (e.g., suspicious distortions), we evade the human-specific bottom-up attention to generate visually-natural camouflages which are correlated to the scenario context. We conduct extensive experiments in both the digital and physical world for classification and detection tasks on up-to-date models (e.g., Yolo-V5) and significantly demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art methods.
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