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تسجيل مستخدم جديدThe theory of games and microbe ecology
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Using game theory we provide mathematical proof that if a species of asexually reproducing microbes does not possess maximum variability in competitive abilities amongst its individual organisms, then that species is vulnerable to replacement by competitors. Furthermore, we prove that such maximally variable species are neutral towards each other in competition for limited resources; they coexist. Our proof is constructive: given one species which does not possess maximum variability, we construct a species with the same (or lower) mean competitive ability which can invade, in the sense that its expected value in competition is positive whereas the expected value of the non-maximally variable species is negative. Our results point towards the mechanistic underpinnings for the frequent observations that (1) microbes are characterized by large intra-specific variability and that (2) the number of extant microbe species is very large.
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