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In this paper, we consider a network of consumers who are under the combined influence of their neighbors and external influencing entities (the marketers). The consumers opinion follows a hybrid dynamics whose opinion jumps are due to the marketing campaigns. By using the relevant static game model proposed recently in [1], we prove that although the marketers are in competition and therefore create tension in the network, the network reaches a consensus. Exploiting this key result, we propose a coopetition marketing strategy which combines the one-shot Nash equilibrium actions and a policy of no advertising. Under reasonable sufficient conditions, it is proved that the proposed coopetition strategy profile Pareto-dominates the one-shot Nash equilibrium strategy. This is a very encouraging result to tackle the much more challenging problem of designing Pareto-optimal and equilibrium strategies for the considered dynamical marketing game.
One of the key features of this paper is that the agents opinion of a social network is assumed to be not only influenced by the other agents but also by two marketers in competition. One of our contributions is to propose a pragmatic game-theoretica
We analyze statistical discrimination in hiring markets using a multi-armed bandit model. Myopic firms face workers arriving with heterogeneous observable characteristics. The association between the workers skill and characteristics is unknown ex an
We study the implications of endogenous pricing for learning and welfare in the classic herding model . When prices are determined exogenously, it is known that learning occurs if and only if signals are unbounded. By contrast, we show that learning
In social networks, individuals constantly drop ties and replace them by new ones in a highly unpredictable fashion. This highly dynamical nature of social ties has important implications for processes such as the spread of information or of epidemic
In the early $20^{th}$ century, Pigou observed that imposing a marginal cost tax on the usage of a public good induces a socially efficient level of use as an equilibrium. Unfortunately, such a Pigouvian tax may also induce other, socially inefficien