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Physical layer authentication relies on detecting unique imperfections in signals transmitted by radio devices to isolate their fingerprint. Recently, deep learning-based authenticators have increasingly been proposed to classify devices using these fingerprints, as they achieve higher accuracies compared to traditional approaches. However, it has been shown in other domains that adding carefully crafted perturbations to legitimate inputs can fool such classifiers. This can undermine the security provided by the authenticator. Unlike adversarial attacks applied in other domains, an adversary has no control over the propagation environment. Therefore, to investigate the severity of this type of attack in wireless communications, we consider an unauthorized transmitter attempting to have its signals classified as authorized by a deep learning-based authenticator. We demonstrate a reinforcement learning-based attack where the impersonator--using only the authenticators binary authentication decision--distorts its signals in order to penetrate the system. Extensive simulations and experiments on a software-defined radio testbed indicate that at appropriate channel conditions and bounded by a maximum distortion level, it is possible to fool the authenticator reliably at more than 90% success rate.
This paper presents a novel fingerprinting scheme for the Intellectual Property (IP) protection of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). Prior solutions for classification models adopt adversarial examples as the fingerprints, which can raise steal
Previous studies have demonstrated that commonly studied (vanilla) touch-based continuous authentication systems (V-TCAS) are susceptible to population attack. This paper proposes a novel Generative Adversarial Network assisted TCAS (G-TCAS) framewor
Ever since Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) emerges as a viable business that utilizes deep learning models to generate lucrative revenue, Intellectual Property Right (IPR) has become a major concern because these deep learning models can easily
RF devices can be identified by unique imperfections embedded in the signals they transmit called RF fingerprints. The closed set classification of such devices, where the identification must be made among an authorized set of transmitters, has been
The Deep Neural Networks are vulnerable toadversarial exam-ples(Figure 1), making the DNNs-based systems collapsed byadding the inconspicuous perturbations to the images. Most of the existing works for adversarial attack are gradient-based and suf-fe