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تسجيل مستخدم جديدApproximate Solutions to a Class of Reachability Games
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In this paper, we present a method for finding approximate Nash equilibria in a broad class of reachability games. These games are often used to formulate both collision avoidance and goal satisfaction. Our method is computationally efficient, running in real-time for scenarios involving multiple players and more than ten state dimensions. The proposed approach forms a family of increasingly exact approximations to the original game. Our results characterize the quality of these approximations and show operation in a receding horizon, minimally-invasive control context. Additionally, as a special case, our method reduces to local gradient-based optimization in the single-player (optimal control) setting, for which a wide variety of efficient algorithms exist.
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