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تسجيل مستخدم جديدPoisonIvy: (In)secure Practices of Enterprise IoT Systems in Smart Buildings
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The rise of IoT devices has led to the proliferation of smart buildings, offices, and homes worldwide. Although commodity IoT devices are employed by ordinary end-users, complex environments such as smart buildings, smart offices, conference rooms, or hospitality require customized and highly reliable solutions. Those systems called Enterprise Internet of Things (EIoT) connect such environments to the Internet and are professionally managed solutions usually offered by dedicated vendors. As EIoT systems require specialized training, software, and equipment to deploy, this has led to very little research investigating the security of EIoT systems and their components. In effect, EIoT systems in smart settings such as smart buildings present an unprecedented and unexplored threat vector for an attacker. In this work, we explore EIoT system vulnerabilities and insecure development practices. Specifically, focus on the usage of drivers as an attack mechanism, and introduce PoisonIvy, a number of novel attacks that demonstrate an attacker can easily compromise EIoT system controllers using malicious drivers. Specifically, we show how drivers used to integrate third-party devices to EIoT systems can be misused in a systematic fashion. To demonstrate the capabilities of attackers, we implement and evaluate PoisonIvy using a testbed of real EIoT devices. We show that an attacker can perform DoS attacks, gain remote control, and maliciously abuse system resources of EIoT systems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to analyze the (in)securities of EIoT deployment practices and demonstrate the associated vulnerabilities in this ecosystem. With this work, we raise awareness on the (in)secure development practices used for EIoT systems, the consequences of which can largely impact the security, privacy, reliability, and performance of millions of EIoT systems worldwide.
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