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تسجيل مستخدم جديدLearnable Strategies for Bilateral Agent Negotiation over Multiple Issues
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We present a novel bilateral negotiation model that allows a self-interested agent to learn how to negotiate over multiple issues in the presence of user preference uncertainty. The model relies upon interpretable strategy templates representing the tactics the agent should employ during the negotiation and learns template parameters to maximize the average utility received over multiple negotiations, thus resulting in optimal bid acceptance and generation. Our model also uses deep reinforcement learning to evaluate threshold utility values, for those tactics that require them, thereby deriving optimal utilities for every environment state. To handle user preference uncertainty, the model relies on a stochastic search to find user model that best agrees with a given partial preference profile. Multi-objective optimization and multi-criteria decision-making methods are applied at negotiation time to generate Pareto-optimal outcomes thereby increasing the number of successful (win-win) negotiations. Rigorous experimental evaluations show that the agent employing our model outperforms the winning agents of the 10th Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC19) in terms of individual as well as social-welfare utilities.
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