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تسجيل مستخدم جديدOne-pixel Signature: Characterizing CNN Models for Backdoor Detection
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We tackle the convolution neural networks (CNNs) backdoor detection problem by proposing a new representation called one-pixel signature. Our task is to detect/classify if a CNN model has been maliciously inserted with an unknown Trojan trigger or not. Here, each CNN model is associated with a signature that is created by generating, pixel-by-pixel, an adversarial value that is the result of the largest change to the class prediction. The one-pixel signature is agnostic to the design choice of CNN architectures, and how they were trained. It can be computed efficiently for a black-box CNN model without accessing the network parameters. Our proposed one-pixel signature demonstrates a substantial improvement (by around 30% in the absolute detection accuracy) over the existing competing methods for backdoored CNN detection/classification. One-pixel signature is a general representation that can be used to characterize CNN models beyond backdoor detection.
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