اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدPoppers falsification and corroboration from the statistical perspectives
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The role of probability appears unchallenged as the key measure of uncertainty, used among other things for practical induction in the empirical sciences. Yet, Popper was emphatic in his rejection of inductive probability and of the logical probability of hypotheses; furthermore, for him, the degree of corroboration cannot be a probability. Instead he proposed a deductive method of testing. In many ways this dialectic tension has many parallels in statistics, with the Bayesians on logico-inductive side vs the non-Bayesians or the frequentists on the other side. Simplistically Popper seems to be on the frequentist side, but recent synthesis on the non-Bayesian side might direct the Popperian views to a more nuanced destination. Logical probability seems perfectly suited to measure partial evidence or support, so what can we use if we are to reject it? For the past 100 years, statisticians have also developed a related concept called likelihood, which has played a central role in statistical modelling and inference. Remarkably, this Fisherian concept of uncertainty is largely unknown or at least severely under-appreciated in non-statistical literature. As a measure of corroboration, the likelihood satisfies the Popperian requirement that it is not a probability. Our aim is to introduce the likelihood and its recent extension via a discussion of two well-known logical fallacies in order to highlight that its lack of recognition may have led to unnecessary confusion in our discourse about falsification and corroboration of hypotheses. We highlight the 100 years of development of likelihood concepts. The year 2021 will mark the 100-year anniversary of the likelihood, so with this paper we wish it a long life and increased appreciation in non-statistical literature.
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