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تسجيل مستخدم جديدStatistical witchhunts: Science, justice & the p-value crisis
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We provide accessible insight into the current replication crisis in statistical science, by revisiting the old metaphor of court trial as hypothesis test. Inter alia, we define and diagnose harmful statistical witch-hunting both in justice and science, which extends to the replication crisis itself, where a hunt on p-values is currently underway.
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