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The maintenance of cooperation in the presence of spatial restrictions has been studied extensively. It is well-established that the underlying graph topology can significantly influence the outcome of games on graphs. Maintenance of cooperation could be difficult, especially in the absence of spatial restrictions. The evolution of cooperation would naturally depend on payoffs. However, payoffs are generally considered to be invariant in a given game. A natural yet unexplored question is whether the topology of the underlying structures on which the games are played, possesses no role whatsoever in the determination of payoffs. Herein, we introduce the notion of cooperator graphs and defector graphs as well as a new form of game payoff, which is weakly dependent on the underlying network topology. These concepts are inspired by the well-known microbial phenomenon of quorum sensing. We demonstrate that even with such a weak dependence, the fundamental game dynamics and indeed the very nature of the game may be altered. Such changes in the nature of a game have been well-reported in theoretical and experimental studies.
Standard epidemiological models for COVID-19 employ variants of compartment (SIR) models at local scales, implicitly assuming spatially uniform local mixing. Here, we examine the effect of employing more geographically detailed diffusion models based
Prisoners dilemma game is the most commonly used model of spatial evolutionary game which is considered as a paradigm to portray competition among selfish individuals. In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn, a strategy updating rule base on aspiration,
The conventional wisdom is that scale-free networks are prone to cooperation spreading. In this paper we investigate the cooperative behaviors on the structured scale-free network. On the contrary of the conventional wisdom that scale-free networks a
The paradox of cooperation among selfish individuals still puzzles scientific communities. Although a large amount of evidence has demonstrated that cooperator clusters in spatial games are effective to protect cooperators against the invasion of def
We model a social-encounter network where linked nodes match for reproduction in a manner depending probabilistically on each node`s attractiveness. The developed model reveals that increasing either the network`s mean degree or the ``choosiness`` ex