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Unified Reinforcement Q-Learning for Mean Field Game and Control Problems

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 نشر من قبل Mathieu Lauri\\`ere
 تاريخ النشر 2020
  مجال البحث الهندسة المعلوماتية
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We present a Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithm to solve infinite horizon asymptotic Mean Field Game (MFG) and Mean Field Control (MFC) problems. Our approach can be described as a unified two-timescale Mean Field Q-learning: The emph{same} algorithm can learn either the MFG or the MFC solution by simply tuning the ratio of two learning parameters. The algorithm is in discrete time and space where the agent not only provides an action to the environment but also a distribution of the state in order to take into account the mean field feature of the problem. Importantly, we assume that the agent can not observe the populations distribution and needs to estimate it in a model-free manner. The asymptotic MFG and MFC problems are also presented in continuous time and space, and compared with classical (non-asymptotic or stationary) MFG and MFC problems. They lead to explicit solutions in the linear-quadratic (LQ) case that are used as benchmarks for the results of our algorithm.

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