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Post-Quantum Multi-Party Computation

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 نشر من قبل Amit Agarwal
 تاريخ النشر 2020
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We initiate the study of multi-party computation for classical functionalities (in the plain model) with security against malicious polynomial-time quantum adversaries. We observe that existing techniques readily give a polynomial-round protocol, but our main result is a construction of *constant-round* post-quantum multi-party computation. We assume mildly super-polynomial quantum hardness of learning with errors (LWE), and polynomial quantum hardness of an LWE-based circular security assumption. Along the way, we develop the following cryptographic primitives that may be of independent interest: 1. A spooky encryption scheme for relations computable by quantum circuits, from the quantum hardness of an LWE-based circular security assumption. This yields the first quantum multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption scheme with classical keys. 2. Constant-round zero-knowledge secure against multiple parallel quantum verifiers from spooky encryption for relations computable by quantum circuits. To enable this, we develop a new straight-line non-black-box simulation technique against *parallel* verifiers that does not clone the adversarys state. This forms the heart of our technical contribution and may also be relevant to the classical setting. 3. A constant-round post-quantum non-malleable commitment scheme, from the mildly super-polynomial quantum hardness of LWE.



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