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تسجيل مستخدم جديدA General Framework for Computing the Nucleolus Via Dynamic Programming
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نشر من قبل
William Justin Toth
تاريخ النشر
2020
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
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This paper defines a general class of cooperative games for which the nucleolus is efficiently computable. This class includes new members for which the complexity of computing their nucleolus was not previously known. We show that when the minimum excess coalition problem of a cooperative game can be formulated as a hypergraph dynamic program its nucleolus is efficiently computable. This gives a general technique for designing efficient algorithms for computing the nucleolus of a cooperative game. This technique is inspired by a recent result of Pashkovich (2018) on weighted voting games. However our technique significantly extends beyond the capabilities of previous work. We demonstrate this by applying it to give an algorithm for computing the nucleolus of b-matching games in polynomial time on graphs of bounded treewidth.
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اقرأ أيضاً
Weighted voting games (WVG) are coalitional games in which an agents contribution to a coalition is given by his it weight, and a coalition wins if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. These games model decision-making in political bodies
as well as collaboration and surplus division in multiagent domains. The computational complexity of various solution concepts for weighted voting games received a lot of attention in recent years. In particular, Elkind et al.(2007) studied the complexity of stability-related solution concepts in WVGs, namely, of the core, the least core, and the nucleolus. While they have completely characterized the algorithmic complexity of the core and the least core, for the nucleolus they have only provided an NP-hardness result. In this paper, we solve an open problem posed by Elkind et al. by showing that the nucleolus of WVGs, and, more generally, k-vector weighted voting games with fixed k, can be computed in pseudopolynomial time, i.e., there exists an algorithm that correctly computes the nucleolus and runs in time polynomial in the number of players and the maximum weight. In doing so, we propose a general framework for computing the nucleolus, which may be applicable to a wider of class of games.
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