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تسجيل مستخدم جديدA Quantum Godelian Hunch
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تأليف
Hippolyte Dourdent
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What if the paradoxical nature of quantum theory could find its source in some undecidability analog to that of Godels incompleteness theorem ? This essay aims at arguing for such Godelian hunch via two case studies. Firstly, using a narrative based on the Newcomb problem, the theological motivational origin of quantum contextuality is introduced in order to show how this result might be related to a Liar-like undecidability. A topological generalization of contextuality by Abramsky et al. in which the logical structure of quantum contextuality is compared with Liar cycles is also presented. Secondly, the measurement problem is analyzed as emerging from a logical error. A personal analysis of the related Wigners friend thought experiment and and a recent paradox by Frauchiger and Renner is presented, by introducing the notion of meta-contextuality as a Liar-like feature underlying the neo-Copenhagen interpretations of quantum theory. Finally, this quantum Godelian hunch opens a discussion of the paradoxical nature of quantum physics and the emergence of time itself from self-contradiction.
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