اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدRethinking the Trigger of Backdoor Attack
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Backdoor attack intends to inject hidden backdoor into the deep neural networks (DNNs), such that the prediction of the infected model will be maliciously changed if the hidden backdoor is activated by the attacker-defined trigger, while it performs well on benign samples. Currently, most of existing backdoor attacks adopted the setting of emph{static} trigger, $i.e.,$ triggers across the training and testing images follow the same appearance and are located in the same area. In this paper, we revisit this attack paradigm by analyzing the characteristics of the static trigger. We demonstrate that such an attack paradigm is vulnerable when the trigger in testing images is not consistent with the one used for training. We further explore how to utilize this property for backdoor defense, and discuss how to alleviate such vulnerability of existing attacks.
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Backdoor attack intends to inject hidden backdoor into the deep neural networks (DNNs), such that the prediction of infected models will be maliciously changed if the hidden backdoor is activated by the attacker-defined trigger. Currently, most exist
ing backdoor attacks adopted the setting of static trigger, $i.e.,$ triggers across the training and testing images follow the same appearance and are located in the same area. In this paper, we revisit this attack paradigm by analyzing trigger characteristics. We demonstrate that this attack paradigm is vulnerable when the trigger in testing images is not consistent with the one used for training. As such, those attacks are far less effective in the physical world, where the location and appearance of the trigger in the digitized image may be different from that of the one used for training. Moreover, we also discuss how to alleviate such vulnerability. We hope that this work could inspire more explorations on backdoor properties, to help the design of more advanced backdoor attack and defense methods.
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