ترغب بنشر مسار تعليمي؟ اضغط هنا

Robustness of Bayesian Neural Networks to Gradient-Based Attacks

115   0   0.0 ( 0 )
 نشر من قبل Ginevra Carbone
 تاريخ النشر 2020
والبحث باللغة English




اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث

Vulnerability to adversarial attacks is one of the principal hurdles to the adoption of deep learning in safety-critical applications. Despite significant efforts, both practical and theoretical, the problem remains open. In this paper, we analyse the geometry of adversarial attacks in the large-data, overparametrized limit for Bayesian Neural Networks (BNNs). We show that, in the limit, vulnerability to gradient-based attacks arises as a result of degeneracy in the data distribution, i.e., when the data lies on a lower-dimensional submanifold of the ambient space. As a direct consequence, we demonstrate that in the limit BNN posteriors are robust to gradient-based adversarial attacks. Experimental results on the MNIST and Fashion MNIST datasets with BNNs trained with Hamiltonian Monte Carlo and Variational Inference support this line of argument, showing that BNNs can display both high accuracy and robustness to gradient based adversarial attacks.



قيم البحث

اقرأ أيضاً

The existence of adversarial examples underscores the importance of understanding the robustness of machine learning models. Bayesian neural networks (BNNs), due to their calibrated uncertainty, have been shown to posses favorable adversarial robustn ess properties. However, when approximate Bayesian inference methods are employed, the adversarial robustness of BNNs is still not well understood. In this work, we employ gradient-free optimization methods in order to find adversarial examples for BNNs. In particular, we consider genetic algorithms, surrogate models, as well as zeroth order optimization methods and adapt them to the goal of finding adversarial examples for BNNs. In an empirical evaluation on the MNIST and Fashion MNIST datasets, we show that for various approximate Bayesian inference methods the usage of gradient-free algorithms can greatly improve the rate of finding adversarial examples compared to state-of-the-art gradient-based methods.
To evaluate the robustness gain of Bayesian neural networks on image classification tasks, we perform input perturbations, and adversarial attacks to the state-of-the-art Bayesian neural networks, with a benchmark CNN model as reference. The attacks are selected to simulate signal interference and cyberattacks towards CNN-based machine learning systems. The result shows that a Bayesian neural network achieves significantly higher robustness against adversarial attacks generated against a deterministic neural network model, without adversarial training. The Bayesian posterior can act as the safety precursor of ongoing malicious activities. Furthermore, we show that the stochastic classifier after the deterministic CNN extractor has sufficient robustness enhancement rather than a stochastic feature extractor before the stochastic classifier. This advises on utilizing stochastic layers in building decision-making pipelines within a safety-critical domain.
Existing generalization measures that aim to capture a models simplicity based on parameter counts or norms fail to explain generalization in overparameterized deep neural networks. In this paper, we introduce a new, theoretically motivated measure o f a networks simplicity which we call prunability: the smallest emph{fraction} of the networks parameters that can be kept while pruning without adversely affecting its training loss. We show that this measure is highly predictive of a models generalization performance across a large set of convolutional networks trained on CIFAR-10, does not grow with network size unlike existing pruning-based measures, and exhibits high correlation with test set loss even in a particularly challenging double descent setting. Lastly, we show that the success of prunability cannot be explained by its relation to known complexity measures based on models margin, flatness of minima and optimization speed, finding that our new measure is similar to -- but more predictive than -- existing flatness-based measures, and that its predictions exhibit low mutual information with those of other baselines.
A novel gradient boosting framework is proposed where shallow neural networks are employed as ``weak learners. General loss functions are considered under this unified framework with specific examples presented for classification, regression, and lea rning to rank. A fully corrective step is incorporated to remedy the pitfall of greedy function approximation of classic gradient boosting decision tree. The proposed model rendered outperforming results against state-of-the-art boosting methods in all three tasks on multiple datasets. An ablation study is performed to shed light on the effect of each model components and model hyperparameters.
We introduce a probabilistic robustness measure for Bayesian Neural Networks (BNNs), defined as the probability that, given a test point, there exists a point within a bounded set such that the BNN prediction differs between the two. Such a measure c an be used, for instance, to quantify the probability of the existence of adversarial examples. Building on statistical verification techniques for probabilistic models, we develop a framework that allows us to estimate probabilistic robustness for a BNN with statistical guarantees, i.e., with a priori error and confidence bounds. We provide experimental comparison for several approximate BNN inference techniques on image classification tasks associated to MNIST and a two-class subset of the GTSRB dataset. Our results enable quantification of uncertainty of BNN predictions in adversarial settings.

الأسئلة المقترحة

التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
mircosoft-partner

هل ترغب بارسال اشعارات عن اخر التحديثات في شمرا-اكاديميا