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تسجيل مستخدم جديدExpand-and-Randomize: An Algebraic Approach to Secure Computation
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We consider the secure computation problem in a minimal model, where Alice and Bob each holds an input and wish to securely compute a function of their inputs at Carol without revealing any additional information about the inputs. For this minimal secure computation problem, we propose a novel coding scheme built from two steps. First, the function to be computed is expanded such that it can be recovered while additional information might be leaked. Second, a randomization step is applied to the expanded function such that the leaked information is protected. We implement this expand-and-randomize coding scheme with two algebraic structures - the finite field and the modulo ring of integers, where the expansion step is realized with the addition operation and the randomization step is realized with the multiplication operation over the respective algebraic structures.
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