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Design, Benchmarking and Explainability Analysis of a Game-Theoretic Framework towards Energy Efficiency in Smart Infrastructure

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 نشر من قبل Hari Prasanna Das
 تاريخ النشر 2019
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In this paper, we propose a gamification approach as a novel framework for smart building infrastructure with the goal of motivating human occupants to reconsider personal energy usage and to have positive effects on their environment. Human interaction in the context of cyber-physical systems is a core component and consideration in the implementation of any smart building technology. Research has shown that the adoption of human-centric building services and amenities leads to improvements in the operational efficiency of these cyber-physical systems directed towards controlling building energy usage. We introduce a strategy in form of a game-theoretic framework that incorporates humans-in-the-loop modeling by creating an interface to allow building managers to interact with occupants and potentially incentivize energy efficient behavior. Prior works on game theoretic analysis typically rely on the assumption that the utility function of each individual agent is known a priori. Instead, we propose novel utility learning framework for benchmarking that employs robust estimations of occupant actions towards energy efficiency. To improve forecasting performance, we extend the utility learning scheme by leveraging deep bi-directional recurrent neural networks. Using the proposed methods on data gathered from occupant actions for resources such as room lighting, we forecast patterns of energy resource usage to demonstrate the prediction performance of the methods. The results of our study show that we can achieve a highly accurate representation of the ground truth for occupant energy resource usage. We also demonstrate the explainable nature on human decision making towards energy usage inherent in the dataset using graphical lasso and granger causality algorithms. Finally, we open source the de-identified, high-dimensional data pertaining to the energy game-theoretic framework.



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