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Penalty Bidding Mechanisms for Allocating Resources and Overcoming Present Bias

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 نشر من قبل Hongyao Ma
 تاريخ النشر 2019
  مجال البحث الهندسة المعلوماتية
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From skipped exercise classes to last-minute cancellation of dentist appointments, underutilization of reserved resources abounds. Likely reasons include uncertainty about the future, further exacerbated by present bias. In this paper, we unite resource allocation and commitment devices through the design of contingent payment mechanisms, and propose the two-bid penalty-bidding mechanism. This extends an earlier mechanism proposed by Ma et al. (2019), assigning the resources based on willingness to accept a no-show penalty, while also allowing each participant to increase her own penalty in order to counter present bias. We establish a simple dominant strategy equilibrium, regardless of an agents level of present bias or degree of sophistication. Via simulations, we show that the proposed mechanism substantially improves utilization and achieves higher welfare and better equity in comparison with mechanisms used in practice and mechanisms that optimize welfare in the absence of present bias.



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