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تسجيل مستخدم جديدElection Control through Social Influence with Unknown Preferences
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The election control problem through social influence asks to find a set of nodes in a social network of voters to be the starters of a political campaign aiming at supporting a given target candidate. Voters reached by the campaign change their opinions on the candidates. The goal is to shape the diffusion of the campaign in such a way that the chances of victory of the target candidate are maximized. Previous work shows that the problem can be approximated within a constant factor in several models of information diffusion and voting systems, assuming that the controller, i.e., the external agent that starts the campaign, has full knowledge of the preferences of voters. However this information is not always available since some voters might not reveal it. Herein we relax this assumption by considering that each voter is associated with a probability distribution over the candidates. We propose two models in which, when an electoral campaign reaches a voter, this latter modifies its probability distribution according to the amount of influence it received from its neighbors in the network. We then study the election control problem through social influence on the new models: In the first model, under the Gap-ETH, election control cannot be approximated within a factor better than $1/n^{o(1)}$, where $n$ is the number of voters; in the second model, which is a slight relaxation of the first one, the problem admits a constant factor approximation algorithm.
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