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تسجيل مستخدم جديدPrice of Privacy in the Keynesian Beauty Contest
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The Keynesian Beauty Contest is a classical game in which strategic agents seek to both accurately guess the true state of the world as well as the average action of all agents. We study an augmentation of this game where agents are concerned about revealing their private information and additionally suffer a loss based on how well an observer can infer their private signals. We solve for an equilibrium of this augmented game and quantify the loss of social welfare as a result of agents acting to obscure their private information, which we call the price of privacy. We analyze t
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