اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدA Novel Approach for Protection of Accounts Names against Hackers Combining Cluster Analysis and Chaotic Theory
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The last years of the 20 th century and the beginning of the 21 th mark the facilitation trend of our real life due to the big development and progress of the computers and other intelligent devices. Algorithms based on artificial intelligence are basically a part of the software. The transmitted information by Internet or LAN arises continuously and it is expected that the protection of the data has been ensured. The aim of the present paper is to reveal false names of users accounts as a result of hackers attacks. The probability a given account to be either false or actual is calculated using a novel approach combining machine learning analysis (especially clusters analysis) with chaos theory. The suspected account will be used as a pattern and by classification techniques clusters will be formed with a respective probability this name to be false. This investigation puts two main purposes: First, to determine if there exists a trend of appearance of the similar usernames, which arises during the creation of new accounts. Second, to detect the false usernames and to discriminate those from the real ones, independently of that if two types of accounts are generated with the same speed. These security systems are applied in different areas, where the security of the data in users accounts is strictly required. For example, they can be used in on-line voting for balloting, in studying the social opinion by inquiries, in protection of the information in different user accounts of given system etc.
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