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We develop the first general semi-bandit algorithm that simultaneously achieves $mathcal{O}(log T)$ regret for stochastic environments and $mathcal{O}(sqrt{T})$ regret for adversarial environments without knowledge of the regime or the number of rounds $T$. The leading problem-dependent constants of our bounds are not only optimal in some worst-case sense studied previously, but also optimal for two concrete instances of semi-bandit problems. Our algorithm and analysis extend the recent work of (Zimmert & Seldin, 2019) for the special case of multi-armed bandit, but importantly requires a novel hybrid regularizer designed specifically for semi-bandit. Experimental results on synthetic data show that our algorithm indeed performs well uniformly over different environments. We finally provide a preliminary extension of our results to the full bandit feedback.
This work studies the problem of learning episodic Markov Decision Processes with known transition and bandit feedback. We develop the first algorithm with a ``best-of-both-worlds guarantee: it achieves $mathcal{O}(log T)$ regret when the losses are
We derive an algorithm that achieves the optimal (within constants) pseudo-regret in both adversarial and stochastic multi-armed bandits without prior knowledge of the regime and time horizon. The algorithm is based on online mirror descent (OMD) wit
We propose an algorithm for stochastic and adversarial multiarmed bandits with switching costs, where the algorithm pays a price $lambda$ every time it switches the arm being played. Our algorithm is based on adaptation of the Tsallis-INF algorithm o
We derive improved regret bounds for the Tsallis-INF algorithm of Zimmert and Seldin (2021). We show that in adversarial regimes with a $(Delta,C,T)$ self-bounding constraint the algorithm achieves $mathcal{O}left(left(sum_{i eq i^*} frac{1}{Delta_i}
This paper investigates the adversarial Bandits with Knapsack (BwK) online learning problem, where a player repeatedly chooses to perform an action, pays the corresponding cost, and receives a reward associated with the action. The player is constrai